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Abstract  
 
The 2011 cross-government Organised Crime Strategy (Home Office, 2011) 
emphasises the need for community safety practitioners to provide information to help 
citizens recognise when they may be vulnerable to serious organised crime so that 
they might take steps to prevent victimisation and the need for the state response to 
serious organised crime to be supported by local communities. Drawing on focus 
group data, this article examines the nature of public concern about serious organised 
crime; citizen views regarding the police (and other agency) response to serious 
organised crime; and how information about serious organised crimes is 
communicated to members of the public. This article finishes by considering 
implications for community safety practice in light of the 2011 Organised Crime 
Strategy.  
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Introduction  
 
There is a sizable literature which examines how ‘serious’ we believe crimes to be, 
the extent to which we ‘worry’ about or are ‘fearful’ of crime as well as the degree to 
which we are ‘confident’ in the criminal justice system. Indeed, the British Crime 
Survey has provided wide ranging data on public perception about crimes and the 
criminal justice system in England and Wales since its inception (Parfrement-Hopkins 
and Green, 2010: 11). As well as generating knowledge about public opinion, these 
data are also used to shape criminal justice practice and have formed the basis of 
performance indicators for the police and other criminal justice agencies over recent 
years (Farrall and Gadd, 2004).  Despite the efforts which have been made to unpick 
the factors which shape citizen perceptions about crime, research explicitly examining 
views about serious organised crime is more limited. This article examines the nature 
of concern about serious organised crimes and the worries and anxieties they create. It 
also considers citizen views of the nature of the police (and other agency) response to 
serious organized crime with a focus on mechanisms of communication and public 
engagement in the event of serious organised crimes occurring.  
 
This article has been written in light of the 2011 cross-government Organised Crime 
Strategy (Home Office, 2011) which places an emphasis on the provision of 
information to help citizens recognise when they may be vulnerable to serious 
organized crime and in turn to take steps to prevent victimisation. The strategy also 
stresses the need for the state response to serious organised crime to be supported by 
local communities. It has also been written in the shadow of broader moves within 
policing and community safety practice to consult with communities about their 
preferences and priorities for police practice; the emphasis on the providing 
information about crime (and other) problems; and the elections of Police and Crime 
Commissioners in England and Walesi. Moves which potentially have, we believe, 
implications for the state response to serious organised crimes.  
 
Approach  
In considering the issue of public concern about serious organised crime we take a 
qualitative approach. This affords an opportunity to consider in more detail some of 
the complexity – and contradictions – inherent in citizens stated views on serious 
organised (and other) crime problems. The article is based on data generated from a 
public consultation exercise which was conducted in two county police services in 
England (Surrey and Sussex) in 2010. This article is based was a series of six focus 
groups which were conducted across the two police services and were primarily 
aimed at generating information to inform the development of a police 
communication strategy for serious organised crime within the wider context of 
improving confidence in the protective services. In total 75 participants voluntarily 
attended the focus groups. We should note that the participants for the focus groups 
were not generated randomly but from ‘key informants’ who were paid £25 each to 
cover expenses. However, attempts were made to reflect demographic diversity. The 
groups were evenly split in gender and there was a rural/urban mix in the locations of 
the focus groups. Although the groups reflected a range of ages the majority of the 
participants were 35-55 years old.   
 
Defining what is, and what is not, a serious organised crime is far from 
straightforward (see for example Hagan, 2006). Government discourse has drawn 
attention to ‘those involved, normally working with others, in continuing serious 
criminal activities for substantial profit, whether based in the UK or elsewhere’ 
(Home Office, 2004: 7) and ‘the definition of organised crime is individuals, normally 
working with others, with the capacity and capability to commit serious crime on a 
continuing basis, which includes elements of planning, control and coordination, and 
benefits those involved’ (Home Office, 2011:8). Whilst, in principle, many crimes 
could fit into these definitions, certain crimes tend to be viewed as inherently more 
organised than others for the purpose of contemporary law enforcement. In the UK 
‘threat assessments’ have drawn particular attention to trafficking of controlled drugs; 
organised immigration crime (people smuggling and human trafficking); financial 
crime (fraud); and organised acquisitive crime (e.g. armed robbery, road freight crime 
and organised vehicle theft) (Home Office, 2011: 9).  
 
The focus group participants discussed definitions of serious organised. Facilitators 
asked participants how they understood the term ‘serious organised crime’ and asked 
for examples of the sorts of incidents that it might incorporate, the elements that 
define ‘serious and organised’ and how such incidents differ from crime in general. 
Reflecting Bullock et al (2009) the broad consensus amongst participants was that 
many crimes, from low level antisocial behaviour to burglary to kidnap and murder, 
all could be organised. For participants, whether a crime was viewed as organised was 
dependent on the context and circumstances in which it occurred. However, the group 
discussion, data analysis and ultimately this article have primarily focused on views 
regarding those crime types – noted above – which are generally viewed as organised 
for the purposes of law enforcement in England and Wales: in particularly Class A 
drug dealing, organised immigration crime and forms of fraud.  
 
The focus group participants were asked to consider the impact of serious organised 
crimes both locally and nationally along with the level of harm that it is perceived to 
cause and to whom. In doing so, discussion was aided by the use of scenarios, the 
nature of which will be discussed in the main body of this article. Participants were 
asked to reflect on state responses to serious organised crime incidents and the effect 
that these have on confidence in the police service and other criminal justice agencies. 
Lastly, the participants were asked to consider the nature of the information that they 
believed the police service (or other organisations) should provide about serious 
organised crime both for the purposes of crime prevention and in the event of serious 
organised crimes occurring. The first part of this article outlines the findings of the 
focus groups. These findings are discussed in light of previous studies in the area and 
the 2011 organised crime strategy in the final sections.  
 
Results  
 
Concern about (serious organised) crime 
Forms of crime generally considered organised for the purpose of law enforcement 
did not generate high levels of concern amongst participants in our focus groups. 
Instead, participants in this study expressed heightened concerns about volume crimes 
such as burglary and vehicle crimes along with behaviours which fall below the 
threshold of criminal offence such as forms of anti-social behaviour. Reflecting 
previous studies conducted in this area, it was clear that respondents did not 
differentiate between crime types when considering how serious they were perceived 
to be and the extent of concern that they generated. Instead, participants drew 
attention to how it was the nature of the act, coupled with the harm that it caused and 
to whom that shaped the level of concern that crimes – and other events – generated. 
The accounts of participants in this study drew attention to how notions of seriousness 
appeared to interact with participants understanding of relative day-to-day crime risks 
in determining which crime types created most concern, with implications for how 
serious organised crimes were understood. We consider these in the following 
sections, starting with fraud.  
 
As noted above, fraud is a form of crime viewed to be organised and prioritised by the 
British government at the time of writing. The nature of fraud is actually very variable 
incorporating amongst others tax and benefit fraud, counterfeiting, investment and 
pension fraud (see Levi and Burrows, 2008). The considerable financial impact on the 
private and public sectors has been demonstrated. Levi et al (2007) conservatively 
estimated that fraud cost the UK £13.9 billion in 2005. The Home Office (2011) 
estimate the cost as between £20 and £40 billion a year. Participants discussed their 
concerns about frauds such as identification theft and credit card frauds. Many 
participants had been victims of these crimes, or knew people who had, and noted the 
inconvenience and worry it can cause. In addition, these kinds of crimes have 
received a great deal of publicity and government attention over recent yearsii and 
reflecting this, some participants noted that they had changed their behaviour to avoid 
victimisation (e.g. shredding documents). For participants, though, these forms of 
fraud did not illicit the highest levels of day-to-day concern. This would seem to be 
because the outcomes of fraud are primarily financial, rather than physical. In certain 
cases – such as credit card fraud – the costs are ultimately absorbed by a financial 
institution rather than an individual. In addition, participants believed that many forms 
of fraud are avoidable and in turn that some victims are partly culpable for their 
victimisation. These points can be fleshed out further drawing on participants’ 
responses to a discussion of an example of a ‘boiler room’ fraud: where fraudsters’ 
cold-call investors offering them worthless, overpriced or non-existent shares.  
 
Participants were invited to discuss a series of boiler room frauds which had been 
committed in the county of Sussex, where half of the focus groups had been 
conducted, which had received local press attention. It involved two perpetrators who 
cold-called individuals and persuaded them to buy shares in a company which turned 
out to be overpriced or worthless. Some ‘investors’ had lost significant amounts of 
money, including one elderly gentleman who had lost nearly £200,000.  Ultimately, 
the two perpetrators were charged with conspiracy to commit fraud, both were found 
guilty and received sentences of 3 ½ years and 18 months respectively. In group 
discussions this fraud aroused only minimal concern. A primary explanation was that 
the frauds did not generate a threat to personal safety either to the victim or more 
widely. One focus group participant noted: ‘It’s all happening very quietly and 
unseen, no one is harmed.’ This participant was drawing attention to how there was 
no apparent threat of violence, or wider criminal activity, which might have diffused 
harm amongst communities over and above the immediate victims themselves. In 
addition, whilst participants expressed sympathy for the victims of these frauds, 
especially those victims who might be considered vulnerable, there was a view that 
the victims were partly culpable for the crime: ‘I don’t know .... because on one hand 
I feel sorry for the victim, but on the other feel he has contributed to it, he was bitten 
and caught’. So whilst participants did raise concerns about vulnerability, and in turn 
expressed concerns about the vulnerability of their elderly friends and relatives, these 
frauds were viewed as avoidable for the majority.  
 
The second theme evident in participants’ accounts – awareness of relative day-to-day 
risks – also has implications for understanding of certain organised crimes. 
Participants felt that they were unlikely to be directly affected by many forms of 
serious organised crime. At the time of writing organised immigration crime is 
viewed by the British government to be ‘a current key threat’ (Home Office, 2011:  9) 
and represents a clear case in point. Human trafficking and smuggling are high profile 
crimes which have attracted much attention from government, law enforcement 
agencies and the media. Participants were certainly aware of the high levels of harm 
experienced by victims of trafficking. Widely publicised cases of immigration crime – 
such as the deaths of some twenty Chinese workers who had been smuggled into the 
UK and lost their lives as they harvested cockles in Morecambe Bay, Lancashire in 
2004 and of 58 Chinese men and women who died in a lorry that was smuggling them 
across the English Channel and into Dover in 2000 – have raised the profile of these 
problems in the UK. However, whilst well aware that victims of organised 
immigration crime could suffer from wide ranging harm, participants drew attention 
to how this is a crime type that the majority will not be directly affected by on a day-
to-day level. If they were affected participants believed it would be through the wider 
consequences of serious organised crimes, such as wider acquisitive crime or 
nuisance, a point most evident in discussions of Class A drug dealing, which forms 
the basis of the forthcoming discussion.  
 
Drug dealing has been shown to demonstrate high levels of public concern and is 
associated with wide ranging harms from the health and social implications for 
individual users, to the implications for communities, to the wider costs to public 
services and society (Bullock et al, 2009). Participants in this study were asked to 
discuss their views about Class A drug dealing focusing on a scenario involving the 
large scale importation of cocaine from Brazil and Ghana and the subsequent 
distribution of the drugs in the county of Sussex.  In this case, 19 defendants were 
charged and 17 of those subsequently convicted. The ring leader was sentenced to 
serve 21 years in prison and to pay a £800,000 confiscation order. This drug dealing 
scenario generated concerns of various types for participants. First and foremost 
participants reported that their concerns were framed in terms of the potential threat to 
their personal safety. This threat was primarily constructed in terms of the wide 
consequences of Class A drug dealing for communities such as acquisitive crime by 
drug users and the associated potential for violence along with the consequences for 
children who may become involved in using drugs or otherwise negatively influenced 
by the presence of drugs. In short, participant concern about availability of Class A 
drugs was primarily driven by a perceived threat to personal safety in turn shaped by 
the proximity to the location of drug markets. Indeed, some participants drew 
attention to how they believed the effects of drug dealing could be circumvented by 
avoiding certain areas where drug dealing was known to be a problem.  
 
Whilst participants did not express concern about many forms of serious organised 
crime on a day-to-day basis, there was much clearer concern about the potential 
impact on the UK as a whole. One focus group participant noting ‘It costs [the 
country] too much in terms of life, distress and financial cost’. As participants did not 
generally have direct experience of serious organised crimes, their concerns about the 
impact for the UK tended to be prompted by media reports of specific events. 
Perceptions of serious organised crimes were event-led and mediated through the 
experiences of other people and through media reporting of the events. Whilst these 
reports did not lead to day-to-day worry about victimisation for participants, media 
reports of serious organised crime certainly raised broader concerns about British 
society, its structures and institutions. Concerns were generally expressed in terms of 
the costs to the UK, as noted in the above quote, along with the competence of the 
police and other institutions to tackle serious organised crime, to which we turn 
shortly, and wider concerns about moral decline throughout society. 
 
The notion that serious organised crime is representative of wider moral decline was 
strongly evident in participant’s discussions. To illustrate, participants expressed their 
disgust at the boiler-room fraud and drug dealing examples discussed above. This 
disgust reflected the impact on the victims, condemnation of the perpetrators and the 
wider implications for society as a whole. Participants believed these sorts of crimes 
were indicative of broader decline in wider social structures which were thought to 
create the conditions in which serious organised crime could flourish. For example, in 
discussing the boiler room fraud participants wondered what role family and 
community played in preventing these crimes. Participants expressed concerns that 
community and family structures have broken down, that people do not necessarily 
know their neighbours or look out for their safety and that this can lead to the 
development of serious organised crime problems.  
 
State response to serious organised crime 
Questions about the competence of the state to tackle serious organised crimes were 
raised by participants. In respect to the drug trafficking scenario participants raised 
questions about the performance of customs, immigration and the police service. 
While a successful outcome – in terms of arrests and convictions – was ultimately 
achieved, and indeed the perpetrators received long sentences, the reports of serious 
organised crime led participants to consider the weaknesses in these institutions. After 
all, the perpetrators had been able to smuggle cocaine into the country and offend for 
some time prior to being caught. It also raised questions about ‘justice’ for some 
participants and it was clear that reports of the outcome to the serious organised crime 
cases were interpreted in terms of wider debates around confidence in the criminal 
justice system, elaborated in the following sections.  
 
There was, in fact, sympathy for the police service which was generally perceived to 
be doing a good job. That said, participants’ views were not informed by any 
understanding of police activity in the area of serious organised crime. One 
participant noting: ‘I don’t feel particularly well informed about how they are tackling 
it, but I don’t feel particularly concerned that they aren’t’. Indeed, several 
participants said that they could not comment on the issue of the police response to 
serious organised crime because they did not feel informed enough. Public confidence 
in the ability of the police service to tackle serious organised crime was somewhat 
vague and based on perceptions and media reports. As the previous quote indicates, 
participants tended to assume that the police were doing a good job, in the absence of 
any information to suggest that they were not. Participants were clearly less confident 
in the wider criminal justice system. Accordingly, participants believed that the 
sentences received were too short (at least in the case of the boiler room fraud). 
Where they did receive lengthy sentences participants believed the perpetrators were 
likely to be released early anyway. They also believed that the proceeds of crime were 
unlikely to be recovered and, even if they were, that they would not be returned to the 
victim.  
 
Communicating information about serious organised crime  
Participants expressed an appetite for information about crime (organised or 
otherwise). However, beyond this general point participant views on the nature and 
extent of police-community consultation about crime problems were not 
straightforward. This raises questions about how much information about serious 
organised crimes is communicated to members of the public and the appropriate 
mechanisms through which to do so.  
 
As we have seen, information about serious organised crime generally comes from the 
media. Participants’ accounts indicated that this potentially leads to at least two 
problems. First, participants noted that media coverage can be extensive and on-
going, especially in relation to significant events (such as a murder) which led some 
to believe that heightened information leads to heightened concerns about crime. One 
participant noting ‘I do worry about media coverage; it gets so out of proportion’. 
Second, participants drew attention to how the media acts as a filter through which 
citizens absorb information about crime. The relationship between media reporting of 
crime and fear of crime is of course a complex one. However, participants certainly 
felt that the media distorts through condensing or editing police reports of crime or by 
overlooking certain information, stressing other information and changing the tone. 
Participants felt that media reports of serious organised crime tend to focus on the 
more ‘graphic’ details of the crime and the modus operandi of the offenders rather 
than on the police operation and its outcomes.  The consequence, for some 
participants at least, was heightened anxiety.   
 
Participants stated that they would look to the police for both reassurance and crime 
prevention advice in respect to serious organised crime. Given that participants 
concerns about crimes seem to be shaped by proximity it is perhaps unsurprising that 
proximity to an event would seem to be a critical factor in the need for reassurance 
from the police service. Participants stated that they would look to the police first and 
foremost for reassurance in the event of an incident involving serious organised crime 
in their immediate locality (e.g. in the road that they live in). However, it was clear 
that participants didn’t necessarily expect to receive information from the police about 
events in this way. One participant who had witnessed armed police raid a house in 
his street said: ‘I don’t know if I’d expect the police to update us. I did have a similar 
incident like this in my neighbourhood once and was annoyed that the police were 
silent to us after that’.  
 
Participants were asked to reflect on where they would get information from if a 
serious incident occurred in their neighbourhood, should they want it. There was a 
general lack of awareness amongst participants about how to access information from 
the police.  Most participants’ spoke of looking to the media for information, while a 
minority mentioned telephoning the police directly.  No one considered contacting 
their local neighbourhood policing team.  Indeed, despite the development of 
neighbourhood policing in England and Wales over the last ten years there appeared 
to be a distinct lack of awareness of these teams and the associated arrangements 
which have been put in place to communicate with the public.  Many participants 
discussed how good it would be to have local meetings where communities could 
share information with the police and were surprised to hear that these already 
existed. 
 
Whilst it was clear that participants did not expect to get information from the police 
about serious organised crime, nor know where to look for it if they did want it, they 
did indicate preferences for the nature and format of police communication in the 
event of serious crimes occurring in their communities. Most clearly participants 
expressed a desire for communication directly from the police where incidents were 
local: ‘I would like someone to come to my door, or if I was out at least to leave a 
letter explaining a bit more about it.  Because it is that much closer to you, I think it’s 
important to know about it’. This perceived need for information predominately 
related to concerns about personal safety and reassurance that, in the aftermath of a 
serious incident, it was safe to go about day-to-day business. The majority of 
participants favoured direct face-to-face communication with police officers as a 
mechanism to communicate information about the event in these circumstances and 
suggested that this should occur as soon as possible. Over the longer term, 
participants expressed a desire to know the outcome of any serious organised crime 
incident in their locality. Participants suggested that failure to communicate outcomes 
leaves people wondering whether the offenders have been released and that 
communities ‘make up their own stories’.  However, as stressed, most people do not 
believe they have experienced serious organised crime, or its aftermath, first hand. 
The first that most will hear about serious organised crimes is what is reported in the 
media. In general, participants were happy to rely on traditional media outlets for 
police communication about serious organised crime where incidents occurred outside 
of their immediate locality.  
 
As we have seen, participants were more worried about ‘everyday crime’ and, 
accordingly, wanted information about how to stay safe and prevent victimisation. 
However, participants certainly stated that this might include information about the 
mechanisms through which organised criminals operate in order that people might 
recognise it and avoid it, as well as other crime prevention advice and information 
about crime hotspots.  
 
Discussion 
 
This article has described the findings of a qualitative study that examined the nature 
of public concern about serious organised crime. Certain forms of crime generally 
considered organised (for the purpose of law enforcement – especially organised 
immigration crime and forms of fraud) did not generate amongst the highest levels of 
concern amongst participants in our focus groups. In seeking to explain this, we have 
examined how concerns about crimes (serious and organised or otherwise) seemed to 
result from the interaction between perceptions about consequences of crimes (in 
terms of physical, emotional or financial impact) and relative risk of victimisation. 
The final sections of this article consider these findings firstly in respect to other 
research in the area and secondly in light of recent organised crime policy 
developments in England and Wales.  
 
The consequence of a crime was a clear factor in shaping how serious participants 
viewed it to be. On the face of it crimes which had a physical impact on victims were 
certainly viewed as the most serious, reflecting the findings of many studies which 
have examined public perceptions of the relative seriousness of crime types. Drawing 
on a comprehensive review of the literature in this area Stylianou (2003: 42) noted 
that ‘violent behaviours (causing bodily harm) are generally perceived as the most 
serious followed by property crime (causing property loss or property damage).’ Yet 
participants did not necessarily report heightened concern about crimes with physical 
consequences. Rather than prioritising those crimes with a physical outcome for 
victims, participants prioritised day-to-day issues such as environmental problems, 
nuisance behaviours and lower level property crimes. A finding which corresponds 
with a wider body of evidence.  
 
Concerns about crime in local areas seem to be shaped by citizen perceptions of 
‘moral consensus, social order, and collective efficacy’ (Jackson, 2011). Issues such 
as antisocial behaviour come to act as indicators of public concern about 
neighbourhood and moral breakdown, along with the pace and direction of social 
change (Jackson, 2011).  Certainly these kinds of concerns were evident in the 
accounts of the focus group participants. In fact even when discussing serious 
organised crime, which overall may not have a raised a great deal of worry, general 
concerns about its effect on societal and moral health were raised.  
 
However, whilst this might provide a context in which concerns about crime were 
raised and discussed by participants, strongly evident were proximate or situational 
factors in participants’ accounts of why some crimes generated more concern than did 
others. This echos studies which have found that that ‘citizens generate their own 
subjective risk estimates, which comprise the interplay between perceived 
consequence, likelihood, and control’ (Jackson, 2011: 531). Warr and Stafford (1983: 
1033) note that that there has been relatively little research on the proximate causes of 
fear of crime – perhaps because ‘the proximate cause of fear of crime seems too 
obvious to merit discussion: one becomes afraid when confronted with the apparent 
likelihood that victimization will occur’. Warr and Stafford (1983: 1040) conclude 
that fear of crime is not simply a function of the perceived outcomes of victimisation 
and that citizens are well aware of the relative risk of different types of victimisation: 
‘perceived risk carries as much weight in producing fear as perceived seriousness’. 
Certainly, the notion of proximity was very evident in this study, with participants 
reporting heightened awareness of the crime (and other problem) types they thought 
they might be at risk from.  
 
In a similar vein to the broad points made by Jackson (2011) and Warr and Stafford 
(1983) Bullock et al (2009) argued that concerns about organised crime types seemed 
to be shaped by an interaction of the severity and probability of impact.  They further 
drew attention to how participants distinguished between where any harms associated 
with crimes primarily fell. Physical, emotional and financial harms that fell at the 
level of the individual were viewed to be more harmful than those that fell at the 
community, business or societal level (Bullock et al, 2009), in part because the harms 
were diffused amongst greater numbers of people and institutions. This resonates with 
the findings reported here. The harms associated with certain forms of serious 
organised crime, notably fraud, might ultimately be seen to be absorbed by the 
institutions of business and governments. In this sense there is no clear victim.  
 
Parallels may usefully be drawn with public views regarding the seriousness of ‘white 
collar’ crime, which a handful of studies have examined (e.g. Schrager and Short, 
1980; Cullen et al, 1982; Rosenmerkel, 2001; Piquero et al, 2008). Historically there 
may have been public indifference to white collar crime – at least compared to other 
forms of crime – although there is evidence that this might be changing. ‘Indifference’ 
to white-collar crime might be the result of diffusion of harm which is in any case 
financial rather than physical in nature. Certainly, as stressed, while people tend to 
agree about which offences are the most serious (Pease, 1985) it would seem that 
‘there is more discord in views about the seriousness of so-called ‘victimless’ crimes 
than in other areas of crime’ (Levi and Jones, 1985: 245). All of the above have 
implications for how serious organised crimes are viewed: there may be no 
discernible victim; the harms absorbed by institutions rather than individuals and the 
economy in some cases; and more generally certain forms of serious organised crimes 
may be of little immediate relevance for many. That said certain types of serious 
organised crime certainly raised more concerns than others. The distribution of Class 
A drugs raises wide-ranging concerns – although focus group responses suggested 
that primary concerns tend to be shaped by the proximity to drug markets and in turn 
to the implications for personal safety, acquisitive crime and the impact of drug 
dealing on the wider environment. 
 
This has implications for how serious organised crime problems are understood by 
communities and potentially how the police and other agencies respond to them. At 
times government discourse on the harm caused by serious organised crime appears 
almost apocalyptic. The foreword to the 2004 organised crime white paper stressing 
‘organised crime is big business. It causes untold harm on our streets, damage to our 
communities and nets billions of pounds each year for those responsible’ (Home 
Office, 2004: iii). Similarly, the 2011 organised crime strategy stresses how 
‘organised crime poses a threat to the UK’s national security. However, unlike other 
national security threats, the effects of organised crime are felt by individuals, 
communities, businesses and our economy on a daily basis’ (Home Office, 2011: 5). 
However, despite government discourse, serious organised crime may well be viewed 
by the public as something that is happening to someone else, somewhere else.  
 
There is a risk is that ‘invisible’ serious organised crimes may not feature on 
community safety agendas which are oriented around the results of public 
consultation. At the time of writing, more than ever, the public have a say about 
which crime types are prioritised by criminal justice agencies in England and Wales. 
Much is made of agreeing priorities between communities and the police service. For 
example, the aforementioned neighbourhood policing agenda is based on the premise 
that policing needs to better address the needs of the community and that the public 
should have a greater say in policing priorities. Citizen views on serious organised 
crime no doubt means that they are unlikely to feature in the priorities for 
neighbourhood policing teams, with the possible exception of drug related offences. 
Indeed, previous research has shown that neighbourhood policing teams are generally 
called on to tackle relatively low level problems, even where more serious crime 
problems are evident (Bullock, 2010). This potentially has new resonance in the 
context of the election of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) who have a 
mandate to allocate resources to problems which the electorate identify as priorities. 
Again we believe the chances are that serious organised crime problems will not 
feature in PCCs plans where they are based on policies aimed at maintaining a 
popular mandate. The Home Office seems to have identified the risk that PCCs will 
commit little resource to invisible serious organised crime problems and notes 
tentative arrangements to mitigate (Home Office, 2011). We finish this article with a 
consideration of these plans in the light of the findings from this study.  
 
First, the serious organised crime strategy seeks to balance local and national 
priorities for policing through supporting PCCs with ‘effective, clear and coordinated 
national arrangements’ (Home Office, 2011: 29). Although the Strategy says little 
about what these are. Second, the strategy seeks to raise awareness of serious 
organised crime problems at the local level: ‘providing a more complete local picture 
on criminality will help ensure organised crime receives the local attention it needs’ 
(Home Office 2011: 28). The Home Office, together with police services, have made 
available ‘crime maps’ which draw together recorded crime statistics for local areas. 
The information has been made available at least in part to help citizens work with the 
police to prioritize local problems for attentioniii . These maps are certainly evolving 
and more detail is being provided over time. However, it is unlikely that they will 
ever provide the level of detail needed to unpick the scale and nature of serious local 
organised crime problems in communities. Even so, given the findings of the study 
reported in this article local forces may face an uphill battle in ensuring ‘organised 
crime receives the local attention it needs’. There is some complexity here. Serious 
organised crimes – in and of themselves – may generate relatively little concern but 
the wider consequences, more evident to residents perhaps, may well generate 
concern on a day-to-day level. Parochial as it may sound to this end information 
should be generated about the wider consequences of serious organised crime 
problems as well as the implications for immediate victims. Again, there are questions 
regarding whether police services will realistically be able to bring this information 
together in a meaningful way.  
 
Third, the Home Office seem to be putting their faith in ability of neighbourhood 
policing teams to both generate information about crime problems, including serious 
organised crime problems, and to communicate the nature of risks with local people: 
 
Neighbourhood policing teams are often very good at obtaining local 
intelligence through their relationships with local communities. We will 
identify best practice in the dissemination of neighbourhood and local 
intelligence that can be used to brief local authorities, police authorities (now) 
and PCCs (from 2012), on organised crime. This will help ensure local leaders 
are better informed and engaged in relation to organised crime threats in their 
localities (Home Office 2011: 28).  
 
There is limited empirical evidence regarding the relationship between neighbourhood 
policing and the generation of information about crime – though certainly successive 
governments have put faith in the principle. However, we do know more about the 
nature of community engagement in neighbourhood policing and, reflecting the 
findings of other research, this article has demonstrated that citizen understanding of 
and engagement in neighbourhood policing is not widespread. This does raise 
questions then about the principle that neighbourhood policing can act, as is 
purported, to stimulate a debate about serious organised (or any other crime) problems 
at the local level.   
 
Lastly, one of the reasons that the organised crime strategy advocates making more 
information about serious organised crime available to communities is to prevent 
victimisation by raising awareness of the threat and methods used by organised 
criminals and providing information to enable businesses and individuals to protect 
themselves (Home Office, 2011: 6). This article has drawn attention to a set of issues 
related to the consumption of information about serious organised (and other) crimes. 
This study, like others, has suggested that citizens have an appetite for information 
about crime, be it about serious organised crime or otherwise. The challenge will be to 
develop meaningful mechanisms to disseminate such information. One issue is that 
citizens seem to consume information about crime passively. They are unlikely to 
seek it out themselves. There would seem to be reliance on the media rather than, for 
example, asking the police directly, searching the internet or attending police-
community meetings. The police (and other agencies) need to recognise the inherent 
weaknesses in communication strategies that rely on active engagement by citizens. 
Instead, law enforcement agencies themselves will need to be proactive in developing 
ways of communicating with communities – perhaps with a focus on the media. 
Another issue relates to the type of information being disseminated.  This article 
draws attention to how citizens look to the police for information for both reassurance 
and crime prevention advice. The findings suggest that there may be gains to 
stratifying communication strategies by place. Reflecting a need for reassurance, there 
would seem to be a preference for swift and direct personal communication from the 
police in the event of incident occurring in an immediate locality – although we 
accept that this may be difficult to achieve in practice. However, where events were 
not local however participants were happy to rely on passive communication – say 
through the media – for information on serious organised crime.  
 
There has been government recognition that law enforcement agencies cannot tackle 
the problem of serious organized crime without the support of communities. 
However, this article has drawn attention to how these problems are invisible to many 
citizens and unlikely to be priorities for them. In light of this authorities may face an 
uphill battle to develop a narrative that brings serious organised crime problems alive. 
However, this issue remains important. Unless the invisible can be rendered visible, 
law enforcement agencies will continue to tackle these problems alone.    
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i Police and Crime Commissioners were elected in November 2012. For the Home Office their aim is 
to ‘cut crime and deliver an effective and efficient police service within their force area.’ The hope is 
that they will ‘provide stronger and more transparent accountability of the police, PCCs will be elected 
by the public to hold chief constables and the force to account; effectively making the police 
                                                                                                                                            
answerable to the communities they serve’. See http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/police/police-crime-
commissioners/ [Jan 1st 2012] 
ii See www.identitytheft.org.uk/for details of the UK government response [accessed Jan 1st 2012] 
iii See http://www.police.uk/ for details [26th May 2012] 
